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Defining the Terms of Academic Freedom:
A Reply to Professor Rabban*
Rebecca S. Eisenberg**
I suspect Professor Rabban is right in saying that we have more
than a semantic dispute.1 But it is difficult to identify our areas of sub-
stantive disagreement with any precision because of a major difference in
the meanings that each of us ascribes to certain key words and phrases.
The essence of my argument is as follows: What I call "the tradi-
tional American conception of academic freedom" justifies professional
autonomy for faculty members as a means of furthering certain academic
values. But the mechanism of faculty autonomy fails to protect these
traditional academic values in the contemporary context of externally
sponsored university research.2 In defining the terms of academic free-
dom and in articulating its underlying justification in this traditional
conception, I rely primarily on two seminal policy statements of the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP): the 1915 Dec-
laration of Principles 3 and the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure.4 These statements define academic freedom as the
freedom of faculty members to research and publish, to teach, and to
speak or write as citizens. Although the AAUP statements do not ex-
plicitly identify the restraints from which academic freedom protects
faculty members, they focus primarily on restraints imposed by univer-
sity trustees and administrators. 5 The statements justify academic free-
dom as an expedient means of furthering the academic values of inquiry,
dissemination, critical objectivity, and professionalism. 6 To avoid confu-
* Copyright © 1988 Rebecca S. Eisenberg.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1975, Stanford Uni-
versity; J.D. 1979, University of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to Judah Garber and Fred
Schauer for their thoughtful comments on these remarks.
1. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1405, 1407
(1988).
2. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEXAS L.
REV. 1363, 1372 (1988).
3. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Declaration of Principles (1915), reprinted in ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE app. A at 157-76 (L. Joughin ed. 1969) [hereinafter 1915
Declaration].
4. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors & Association of Am. Colleges, Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra
note 3, at 33-39 [hereinafter 1940 Statement].
5. See 1940 Statement, supra note 4, at 34-36; 1915 Declaration, supra note 3, at 163-74.
6. See 1940 Statement, supra note 4, at 34; 1915 Declaration, supra note 3, at 158.
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sion with other conceptions of academic freedom, I refer to this particu-
lar conception as "the traditional American conception of academic
freedom."' 7 To distinguish -the substantive terms of academic freedom
from its underlying rationale, I sometimes refer to the former as the "def-
inition" of academic freedom s or "faculty autonomy"9 and to the latter
as the "justification" for academic freedom 0 or "academic values."1"
In this traditional conception of academic freedom, faculty auton-
omy furthers academic values by protecting faculty members from uni-
versity administrators who might otherwise use their power as employers
to make faculty members behave in accordance with the political and
financial interests of the uraiversity's benefactors. I argue that when
faculty members themselves need to find outside sponsors to fund their
research, they stand to be co-opted directly by the political and financial
interests of those sponsors, and faculty autonomy is therefore an inade-
quate mechanism for protecting academic values in this context. In
other words, the traditional "definition" of academic freedom is no
longer in harmony with its traditional "justification" in contemporary
sponsored research.
Professor Rabban asserts that I have confused "an adulterated ver-
sion of academic freedom with the traditional conception," and that I
therefore perceive a "conflict between academic freedom and .academic
values that does not actually exist."1 2 This assessment seems to be based
at least in part on a misunderstanding of my use of the terms set forth
above. For example, Professor Rabban sometimes asserts that I have
characterized the traditional American conception of academic freedom
as supporting unfettered professional autonomy for faculty members,1 3
although elsewhere he contradicts himself on this point14 Lest other
readers come away with the same misunderstanding of my argument, let
me repeat: When I refer to the "definition" of academic freedom in the
traditional conception, I refer only to the substantive terms of academic
7. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1:163-64, 1371, 1373, 1381, 1383-84, 1390, 1404.
8. Id. at 1365, 1367-68, 1373-74..
9. Id. at 1371-72, 1389, 1391, 1,04.
10. Id. at 1365, 1370, 1372-73, 1384, 1404.
11. Id. at 1363-64, 1367, 1371-72, 1374-76, 1380-84, 1388, 1391-93, 1396-97, 1401, 1403-04.
12. Rabban, supra note 1, at 1406, 1407.
13. Professor Rabban states that "[alccording to Eisenberg, academic freedom, particularly as
defined in many of the AAUP's influential documents, consists simply of the right of individual
faculty members to be left alone in performing their research and teaching." Id. at 1406. He also
states that "[c]ontrary to Professor Eisenberg's repeated assertions, [the traditional conception of
academic freedom] has never reduced academic freedom to an unfettered individual right to teach
and research." Id. at 1407.
14. For example, Professor Rabban states that "[a]s Professor Eisenberg recognizes, the
AAUP's seminal 1915 Declaration of Principles on academic freedom does not endorse unqualified




freedom in that conception-the freedom of faculty members to research,
publish, and teach without restraints imposed by university administra-
tions. I do not refer to the underlying academic values that academic
freedom is supposed to further, nor to other competing values that might
(or might not) override the values served by academic freedom, nor to
norms of professional competence that continue to govern faculty mem-
bers notwithstanding their freedom from restraints imposed by lay uni-
versity administrators, nor to the peer review mechanisms by which these
professional norms are enforced. In excluding these values, norms, and
mechanisms from the definition of academic freedom, I do not mean to
deny their existence or to minimize their importance. They simply are
not what I mean by "academic freedom."
My usage is consistent with most of the scholarly literature on aca-
demic freedom. Most definitions of academic freedom, including those
cited in my article and in Professor Rabban's essay, 15 express what Ger-
ald MacCallum has called a "triadic relation" involving an agent or
agents, a preventing condition or conditions, and a range of actions. 16 In
these definitions, academic freedom is the freedom of certain agents
(professors, students, and universities) to engage in certain activities (re-
search and writing, teaching, and extramural utterances) without re-
straint from certain authorities (universities, governments, and religious
entities).
Professor Rabban offers a similar triadic definition of academic free-
dom: "Classic discussions of academic freedom stress the freedom of the
professor to investigate, teach, and publish, subject only to scholarly
standards and professional ethics. Other restrictions on the choice of re-
search or on the expression of scholarly views, whatever their source,
violate academic freedom."' 17 In this definition the relevant agent is the
professor, the relevant preventing conditions are restrictions other than
scholarly standards and professional ethics, and the relevant range of ac-
tions is investigation, teaching, and publication. But Professor Rabban's
15. See sources cited in Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1365 nn.5-7; sources cited in Rabban, supra
note 1, at 1408 n.l1.
16. MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REv. 312, 314 (1967). MacCallum's
triadic approach clarifies confusion arising from earlier discussions of freedom that attempted to
distinguish between "positive freedom," or "freedom to," and "negative freedom," or "freedom
from." See, eg., I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY.118, 121-41
(1969); Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 130607 (1955). MacCal-
lum demonstrates that all intelligible statements about freedom must at least implicitly refer to an
agent, a preventing condition, and a range of actions or goals, and that all such statements about
freedom thus have both positive and negative aspects. For a thoughtful discussion of the literature
on positive and negative freedom, see Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"--Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 550-54.
17. Rabban, supra note I, at 1408.
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actual use of the term "academic freedom" in the body of his essay is
much broader than this opening definition would suggest, embracing not
only faculty autonomy, but also other mechanisms for furthering aca-
demic values and norms such as peer review, and even the underlying
values and norms themselves.
Although Professor Rabban commends me for distinguishing be-
tween "academic freedom and academic values, terms that too often are
vaguely defined and improperly conflated,"1s he himself conflates these
terms throughout his essay. He states that "academic freedom includes
adherence to professional norms" 19 and that "[t]he traditional definition
of academic freedom... includes a variety of norms designed as prag-
matic means of implementing the search for knowledge. ' 20 In Professor
Rabban's usage, "academic freedom" itself enjoins faculty members to
observe these professional norms: "Professors violate the norms of aca-
demic freedom when they falsify or plagiarize material, indoctrinate stu-
dents, follow blindly the dictates of political or religious authority, or
allow grants from government or industry to distort their research and
conclusions. 2 1 In other words, professors may claim the protection of
"academic freedom" only when they follow professional norms; con-
versely, they violate "academic freedom" when they depart from these
norms.
According to Professor Rabban, it is the function of peer review to
detect such "violations" of academic freedom. He states that:
"[b]eginning with the 1915 Declaration, commentators have identified
peer review as the primary method of determining whether individual
professors have violated, or have engaged in activities unprotected by,
academic freedom." 22 This statement suggests a conception of peer re-
view not as a separate constraint on faculty autonomy from which "aca-
demic freedom" offers no protection, but as an enforcement mechanism
for uncovering violations of "academic freedom" by faculty members
themselves.
I find this usage confusing and misleading. The purpose of peer re-
view is to assess the merit of academic work by professional standards,
not to spot violations of academic freedom. Faculty members whose
18. Id at 1407.
19. Id at 1406.
20. Id at 1407. Professor Rabban sometimes uses the term "academic freedom" to refer to the
underlying interests that justify faculty autonomy rather than to faculty autonomy itself. Thus he
refers to "the potential for faculty abuse of the autonomy justified by academic freedom." Id at
1416.





work is found incompetent through peer review may be subject to sanc-
tions, but it does not follow that even incompetent academic work either
violates or is "unprotected by" academic freedom. To extend the label
"academic freedom" to the obligation of faculty members to comply with
professional norms is to lose the special sense of academic freedom as a
limited liberty from nonprofessional restraints on academic work.
Professor Rabban also extends the term "academic freedom" to the
interest of peer review bodies in judging the merit of academic work:
The commentators23 thus seem implicitly to conceive of two
related types of academic freedom: the freedom of the individual
professor to pursue teaching and research, and the freedom of
faculty peers to judge whether individual professors have fulfilled
their professional responsibilities. These two types of academic
freedom are in tension and, occasionally, in conflict.24
Again, the use of a single term to refer to these two separate interests is
unnecessary and confusing. I do not dispute that peer review is an im-
portant, time-honored constraint on faculty autonomy that furthers some
of the same academic values identified in the traditional justification for
academic freedom. Indeed, as I note in my article, the authors of the
1915 Declaration hoped that peer review would forestall lay regulation of
academic work and thereby further the value of academic professional-
ism. 25 But the interest of faculty committees in performing this function
does not fall within what I call the traditional "definition" of academic
freedom. Academic freedom in this traditional definition neither con-
flicts with peer review nor protects it. Peer review is another mechanism
that operates in tandem with faculty autonomy to further academic
values.
In Professor Rabban's usage, "academic freedom" prohibits faculty
members from using their professional autonomy in ways that conflict
with the underlying academic values that academic freedom is supposed
to further. Whenever faculty members undermine these academic val-
ues, they "violate the norms of academic freedom" and are therefore be-
yond the scope of its protection. In this definition "academic freedom"
corresponds perfectly with the academic values it embraces; to state that
"academic freedom" conflicts with these academic values would there-
23. Here Professor Rabban evidently refers to the authors of AAUP policy statements and to
Arthur Lovejoy and William Van Alstyne writing in their individual capacities. Professor Rabban
does not claim that these commentators explicitly attach the label of academic freedom to the inter-
est of faculty peers in performing peer review.
24. Rabban, supra note 1, at 1412.
25. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1366-67 & n.12.
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fore involve an inherent con:radiction in terms. 26
Of course, attaching the label "academic freedom" to professional
norms and academic values tells us nothing about how we can enforce
these norms and advance these values. The primary mechanism put
forth in the traditional American conception of academic freedom is
faculty autonomy. I have argued that this mechanism is ill-suited to the
task of protecting academic values in sponsored research. Professor Rab-
ban evidently agrees with me-at least to a point.27
Another mechanism for protecting academic values which Professor
Rabban highlights (although he loosely subsumes this mechanism under
his broad conception of academic freedom) is peer review. Can peer re-
view be expected to make up for the deficiencies of faculty autonomy as a
mechanism for protecting academic values in sponsored research? I have
not addressed this question in my article, and a thorough answer is be-
yond the scope of this reply. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why
I think that peer review is an inadequate mechanism to solve the
problems that I have identified.
First, peer review committees may not be competent to detect or
counteract influences from outside the academy that are distorting how
faculty members exercise their autonomy. The traditional ftnction of
peer review committees has been simply to assess the professional merit
of academic work, not to inspect it for evidence of external influence.
Distortions in favor of the interests of sponsors may be subtle and consid-
erably more difficult to spot than professional incompetence or miscon-
duct. Assuming the research has some academic merit and is
competently formulated, a peer review committee might be helpless to
detect and expose the influence of the sponsor's nonacademic interests on
the faculty member's academic interests. 28
Second, members of peer review committees may themselves be co-
opted directly or indirectly by the interests of research sponsors. Peer
review committees are generally composed of colleagues in the same or
26. There might still be room for disagreement about the content of the academic norms and
values embraced by the term "academic freedom."
27. Professor Rabban balks at limiting faculty autonomy by requiring prior approval of spon-
sored research proposals. See infra nole 30 and accompanying text.
28. The traditional conception of academic freedom assumes that faculty members will gener-
ate new knowledge most effectively if they can freely pursue the lines of inquiry that most interest
them, and that faculty members will do just that in the absence of university-imposed restraints on
free inquiry. But faculty members who rely on outside sponsors to fund their research have a finan-
cial incentive to conform their research projects to meet the needs of their sponsors. Yet since no
one other than the faculty member doing the research can say whether the selected research problem
is more or less interesting to her than some other, unidentified problem for which funding is unavail-




similar fields who also depend on research sponsors for financial support.
Even if the particular project has no financial impact on the individual
peer reviewers or their institutions, 29 their assessment of the academic
merit of sponsored research projects will inevitably be influenced by their
own research agendas, which in all likelihood have been conditioned by
their awareness of the kinds of research questions for which funding is
available. Peer reviewers are unlikely to adopt standards of academic
merit for their colleagues' sponsored research projects that their own
sponsored research projects would not satisfy.
Third, peer review tends to be strictly reactive, serving only to ap-
prove or disapprove the outcome of individual faculty members' deci-
sions about what research they will do, how they will do it, and how they
will write it up. Peer review committees might tell faculty members that
the work they have done or propose to do is unacceptable, but it is not
their function to tell them what research projects they should have done
or should do instead. These affirmative decisions necessarily rest in the
first instance with faculty members themselves. Peer review can never
replace the undistorted judgment of unbiased faculty members in con-
ceiving and performing research projects. At best, peer review might al-
low after-the-fact detection of particularly blatant distortions in favor of
sponsors' interests, and the prospect of such detection could have a bene-
ficial deterrent effect in some cases.
30
29. Peer reviewers in the same institution might view the research funding as important to the
financial interests of their department or university and thus have an indirect financial stake in
approving the research project.
30. Subjecting sponsored research proposals to peer review before they are approved might be
more effective. A subcommittee of the AAUP's Committee A suggested advance approval of re-
search proposals by faculty committees as a mechanism for assuring the academic merit of corpo-
rate-sponsored research. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Academic Freedom and Tenure:
Corporate Funding of Academic Research, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 18a, 23a. Provisions for
prior review of sponsored research proposals for academic merit also appear in a significant minority
of the university research policies I studied. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1402 n.107. But even if
peer review occurs before the research is performed, peer reviewers could still do nothing more than
react to a research project selected by a faculty member whose decision, in all likelihood, has already
been influenced by the interests of the research sponsor. Such a reactive mechanism can at best only
partially compensate for distortion in the antecedent judgments of the faculty members actually
doing or proposing to do the research.
Professor Rabban opposes requiring prior approval of the scholarly value of sponsored research
proposals on the ground that it unduly restricts faculty autonomy, asserting that such a requirement
"should strike virtually everyone as a violation of academic freedom." Rabban, supra note 1, at
1419. This conclusion appears to be based on a conception of "academic freedom" that conflicts
with academic values. Certainly, requiring prior approval of the subject matter of a proposed re-
search project may interfere with a faculty member's autonomy in selecting research topics. This
interference may be justified, however, if faculty autonomy is not a matter of intrinsic individual
rights but rather an instrumental means of furthering traditional academic values. Prior approval
mechanisms for sponsored research may help protect academic values when financial interests might
otherwise lead faculty members to orient their research projects to meet sponsors' needs. If faculty
members cannot be trusted to exercise their autonomy in ways that further academic values, univer-
1437
Texas Law Review
In sum, even if one defines "the traditional conception of academic
freedom" to include peer review, the academic community still needs to
find additional mechanisms for protecting academic values in sponsored
research. If one uses the lerm "academic freedom" loosely, however, it
may not be necessary to attach new labels to these mechanisms. Instead,
one could simply incorporate other mechanisms for furthering academic
values, along with peer review, into our ever-evolving conception of aca-
demic freedom.
It is tempting to stretch the label of academic freedom to encompass
other mechanisms for furthering academic values because of the high sta-
tus and respect that the label commands in our society. But there are
also dangers in this approach. Professor Van Alstyne has eloquently
stated one such danger in arguing against the inclusion of faculty mem-
bers' general civil liberties under the heading of academic freedom:
Gresham's law, that "bad money tends to drive out good money,"
applies equally to catchwords as it does to currency. Bad usages
tend to drive out good usages, and by much the same sort of pro-
cess. The process begins in the ordinary human impulse to seize
upon certain significant phrases in an altered context, trading upon
those phrases to improve an argument that might otherwise fail to
impress those to whom. it is directed. The process comes to its end
when the constant overuse of such phrases becomes so very appar-
ent that we are made 'to feel apologetic for having to use them at
all--even when we believe them to be crucial in what we mean to
convey. In short, the process begins with the inflation of rhetoric,
and it ends with the debasement of meaning.31
Thus the label "academic freedom" may lose its force if it is used to
mean too many different things.
A related hazard is that extending old labels to new ideas makes it
more difficult to recognize the limitations of old ideas. This difficulty
arises in part because ambiguity in the meaning of key terms interferes
with clear thinking. It is difficult to analyze the effectiveness of "aca-
demic freedom" as a means of furthering academic values if it is not clear
what "academic freedom"' means. The difficulty is compounded by the
fact that challenges to "academic freedom" inevitably provoke defensive
reactions among faculty. If instead of calling into question the continu-
ing effectiveness of "academic freedom" as a means of protecting aca-
sities need to find other mechanisms for protecting these values. While I have some doubts about the
adequacy of peer review as a solution to the problem, I do not think that prior peer review of
sponsored research proposals should be excluded from consideration on the ground that it violates
academic freedom.
31. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Lib-




demic values we simply revise the meaning of "academic freedom" to
meet new problems without changing our terminology, some people
might still understand "academic freedom" to mean "faculty auton-
omy." Consequently, we create a risk that old principles will be applied
thoughtlessly and inappropriately in new contexts.
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